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This paper studies the relations which exist between Dempster–Shafer Theory and one
of its extensions which considers frames of discernment with non-exclusive hypotheses.
More precisely, we use propositional logic to show that this extension can be reformulated
in the classical framework of Dempster–Shafer theory, showing that, even if it allows to
manipulate more compact expressions, it is not more expressive. Finally, we believe that
using propositional logic as the basics for modeling concepts in Dempster–Shafer Theory
can help logicians to understand this theory and its extension to non-exclusive hypotheses.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Dempster–Shafer Theory [16] is one of themain theorieswhich dealwith uncertainty. Because of the combination rules it
provides, it is widely used in information fusion context. This theory has motivated and is still motivatingmany studies, e.g.,
applicative studies [1,7,14,12] or more fundamental works whose aim is to extend this theory, to propose new combination
rules or to give interpretations to this theory [13,17–19,2,3].
One interesting extension of Dempster–Shafer Theory consists in considering frames of discernment with non-exclusive
hypotheses [8,15]. Indeed,while Dempster–Shafer Theory assumes that frames of discernment are sets of exclusive hypothe-
ses, this extension assumes that hypotheses may intersect.
In this present paper, which is an extended version of [4], we aim at formally comparing this extension and Dempster–
Shafer Theory. More precisely, we show that this extension can be reformulated in Dempster–Shafer Theory and thus, from
an expressiveness point of view, it is equivalent to Dempster–Shafer Theory.
For establishing this correspondence, we apply an important property of propositional logic. Given a propositional lan-
guage, this property ensures the existence of a bijection between the quotient set defined by the equivalence relation on the
set of formulas and the power set of interpretations. More precisely, any formula of the language is associatedwith the set of
its models (called its truth-set) and moreover, all the formulas which are equivalent are associated with the same truth-set.
We then show that a frame of discernmentwith non-exclusive hypotheses can be viewed as a propositional language and
that expressions which are assigned amass can be viewed as formulas of this language. By the previous bijection, this comes
down to assigning masses to sets of interpretations which are, by definition, exclusive. Thus, we are back to the classical
Dempster–Shafer framework in which hypotheses are exclusive.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reminds the notions of logic needed for the comprehension of the paper.
Section 3 quickly presents Dempster–Shafer Theory and its extension to non-exclusive hypotheses. Section 4 uses logic to
analyse this extension. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Propositional logic
Let us first recall some preliminary definitions that will be useful in the rest of the paper.
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• A propositional language  is defined by a set of propositional letters, connectives¬,∧,∨,→,↔ and parentheses. We
will use small-letters to denote propositional letters.
• The set of formulas, denoted FORM, is the smallest set of words built on this alphabet such that: if a is a letter, then a is
a formula; ¬A is a formula if A is a formula; A ∧ B is a formula if A and B are formulas. Other formulas are defined by
abbreviation. More precisely, A∨ B denotes¬(¬A∧¬B); A → B denotes¬A∨ B; A ↔ B denotes (A → B) ∧ (B → A).
• A literal is a letter or the negation of a letter. In the first case it is positive, in the second it is negative.
• A clause is a disjunction of literals.
• A positive clause is a clause whose literals are positive.
• A clause C1 subsumes a clause C2 iff the literals of C1 are literals of C2.• An interpretation i is a mapping from the set of letters to the set of truth values {0, 1}. An interpretation i can be extended
to the set of formulas by: i(¬A) = 1 iff i(A) = 0; i(A ∧ B) = 1 iff i(A) = 1 and i(B) = 1.
Consequently, i(A ∨ B) = 1 iff i(A) = 1 or i(B) = 1, and i(A → B) = 1 iff i(A) = 0 or i(B) = 1; i(A ↔ B) = 1 iff
i(A) = i(B).
• Notation. Usually, an interpretation i is represented by a set made of the propositional letters which are assigned to 1 by
i and negation of propositional letters which are assigned to 0 by i.
For instance, if a, b, c are the three letters of the language, then the interpretation i defined by: i(a) = 1 and i(b) =
i(c) = 0 is represented (by notation) by the set {a,¬b,¬c}. This notation will be used in the following.
• The set of interpretations of the language  will be denoted I.• The interpretation i is a model of formula A iff i(A) = 1. We say that i satisfies A.
• The truth-set of formula A is the set of models of A. It is denotedmod(A). We have:mod(A) ∈ 2I .
• A is satisfiable iff there exists a model of A.
• Let σ be a satisfiable formula.mod(A ∧ σ) is called the σ -truth-set of formula A.
• Let A and B be two formulas. B is a logical consequence of A iffmod(A) ⊆ mod(B). It is denoted A | B.
• Let A and B two formulas. A and B are logically equivalent iff mod(A) = mod(B). It is denoted | A ↔ B. Thus, two
equivalent formulas have the same truth-set.
• Finally, in what follows, it is sufficient to consider a finite language i.e a language composed of a finite set of letters. We
will denote σ0 the formula which is the disjunction of all these letters.
Definition 1. Let σ be a satisfiable formula. We define an equivalence relation denoted
σ↔ on FORM as follows. Let A and B
two formulas. Then,
A
σ↔ B iff σ | A ↔ B
Thus, two formulas are related by relation
σ↔ if and only if they are equivalent when σ is true. For instance, (a∧ b) a↔ b.
Definition 2. Letσ be a satisfiable formula. Let S be a set of formulas.Wenote S/
σ↔ thequotient set of S given the equivalence
relation
σ↔.
Definition 3. Let σ be a satisfiable formula. We define a function Modσ from FORM/
σ↔ to 2mod(σ ) by: if c belongs to
FORM/
σ↔, thenModσ (c) = mod(A ∧ σ) where A is any formula in class c.
Theorem 1. Modσ is a bijection from FORM/
σ↔ to 2mod(σ )
Proof. We first show that any element of 2mod(σ ) has an antecedent byModσ . Then we show that this antecedent is unique
• Let E ∈ 2mod(σ ). Thus E ⊂ mod(σ ) and we can write E = {i1, . . . , in}where each ij is a model of σ .
Consider the formula:
AE = ∨j=1...n(∧ij(a)=1 a ∧
∧
ij(a)=0 ¬a).
Obviously, E = mod(AE).
Then, since E ⊂ mod(σ ), we have: E = mod(AE ∧ σ).
Thus, the equivalence class of AE for relation
σ↔ is an antecedent of E byModσ .
• Let E ∈ 2mod(σ ). Suppose that there are two equivalent classes for relation σ↔, C1 and C2 such that
Modσ (C1) = Modσ (C2) = E.
By definition we have: E = mod(A1 ∧ σ)where A1 is any formula of C1, and E = mod(A2 ∧ σ)where A2 is any formula
of C2.
I.e, | A1 ∧ σ ↔ A2 ∧ σ .
Thus σ | A1 ↔ A2.
This implies that A1 and A2 belong to the same equivalence class, i.e,
C1 = C2. 
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This proposition states that formulas which are equivalent in terms of relation
σ↔ do have the same σ -truth-set and that
any subset ofmod(σ ) is the σ -truth-set of formulas which are all equivalent for relation
σ↔.
Example 1. Consider a language whose letters are a, b, c. I contains 8 elements which are the following interpretations:
i1 = {a, b, c}, i2 = {a, b,¬c}, i3 = {a,¬b, c}, i4 = {a,¬b,¬c},
i5 = {¬a, b, c}, i6 = {¬a, b,¬c}, i7 = {¬a,¬b, c}, i8 = {¬a,¬b,¬c}.
• σ0 is the formula a ∨ b ∨ c andmod(σ0) = {i1, . . . , i7}.
• Let C1 be the equivalence class, for σ0↔, of formula a ∧ (b ∨ c). Then,Modσ0(C1) = {i1, i2, i3}.
• Furthermore, let I1 = {i2, i4}.Modσ−10 (I1) is the equivalence class, for σ0↔, of the formula a ∧ ¬c.
Definition 4. A formula is underminimal positive conjunctive normal form (denoted +mcnf) if it is a conjunction of positive
clauses such that no clause subsumes another one. The set of +mcnf-formulas is denoted+mcnfFORM.
For instance a is a +mcnf-formula; a ∧ (a ∨ b) is not because a subsumes a ∨ b; a ∧ ¬c is not because¬c is negative.
Theorem 2. Modσ is not a bijection from +mcnfFORM/ σ↔ to 2mod(σ )
Proof. As a counter example, I1 in the previous example, is not a truth-set of any+mcnf -formula. 
3. Dempster–Shafer Theory and its extension to non-exclusive hypotheses
In this section, we first recall the main notions of Dempster–Shafer Theory. Then we present its extension to non-
exclusive hypotheses studying first the case when there are no integrity constraints then the case when there are some.
3.1. Dempster–Shafer Theory
Dempster–Shafer Theory considers a finite frame of discernment  = {θ1, . . . , θn} whose elements, called hypotheses,
are exhaustive and exclusive.
A basic belief assignment (or mass function) is a functionm : 2 → [0, 1] such that:m(∅) = 0 et∑A⊆ m(A) = 1.
Given a basic belief assignment m, one can define a belief function Bel : 2 → [0, 1] by: Bel(A) = ∑B⊆A m(B). One can
also define a plausibility function Pl : 2 → [0, 1] such that Pl(A) = 1 − Bel(A).
Let m1 and m2 be two basic assignments on the frame . Dempster’s combination rule defines a basic belief assignment
denotedm1 ⊕ m2, from 2 to [0, 1] by:
m1 ⊕ m2(∅) = 0
m1 ⊕ m2(C) =
∑
A∩B=C m1(A) · m2(B)
N
for any C = ∅
with
N = ∑
A∩B =∅
m1(A) · m2(B)
Several other combination rules have been defined but we do not need to detail them here.
3.2. Extension to non-exclusive hypotheses: case of free models
The formalism described by Dezert [8] assumes that frames of discernement are finite sets of hypotheses which are
exhaustive but not necessarily exclusive. We quickly present it here.
Let = {θ1, . . . , θn} be a frame of discernment. Dezert [8] introduces the notion of hyper-power-set D as the set made
of ∅, θ1,…, θn and all the expressions composed from the hypotheses and operators ∪ and ∩ such that: if A ∈ D and if
B ∈ D then (A ∪ B) ∈ D and (A ∩ B) ∈ D.
Example 2. If  = {θ1, θ2} then D = {∅, θ1, θ2, θ1 ∩ θ2, θ1 ∪ θ2}.
However, we notice that this definition does not correspond to the examples given in [8]. For instance, according to this
paper, for n = 3, (θ2 ∪ θ3)∩ θ1 belongs to D but (θ2 ∩ θ1)∪ (θ3 ∩ θ1) does not, while they characterize the same element.
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In the same way, (θ1 ∩ θ2) ∪ θ3 appears but (θ1 ∪ θ3) ∩ (θ2 ∪ θ3) does not. However, these two expressions which do not
appear are well formed according to the definition of D in [8].
This is why we introduce the following definition.
Definition 5. Given a frame , we say that an expression is under reduced conjunctive normal form (rcnf-expression), iff
it is an intersection of unions of hypotheses of  such that no union contains another one.
For instance, θ1 ∩ (θ1 ∪ θ2) is not a rcnf-expression because θ1 ⊂ θ1 ∪ θ2; θ1 is a rcnf-expression.
It has been acknowledged in [9], that D should be defined as the set of all the expressions under reduced conjunctive normal
form that can be built. We then take this definition in the rest of the paper.
In this extension, the basic belief assignments are defined on elements of the hyper-power-set D. Definitions of belief
functions and plausibility functions are unchanged. Finally, several combination rules have been defined.
In particular, the normalized combination rule in [8] takes two basic belief assignments m1 and m2, and builds a third
assignment:m1 [⊕] m2 : D → [0, 1] so that:
m1[⊕]m2(C) =
∑
A∩B=C m1(A).m2(B)
N
N being the sum of all the massesm1[⊕]m2(C).
3.3. Extension to non-exclusive hypotheses: case of hybrid models
Hybridmodels introduced in [15], correspond to the case when some constraints are expressed on the hypotheses. These
constraints, called integrity constraints, force some intersections to be empty.
In the following, IC denotes an expression of the form E = ∅, where E ∈ D. Let us notice that even if there are
several integrity constraints, E1 = ∅ · · · En = ∅, we can always get to the case of a unique integrity constraint by taking
E = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ En.
For the authors of [15], taking integrity constraints into account comes down to considering a restriction of the hyper
power set D. This restricted set contains less elements than in the general case and we will denote it DIC to indicate the
fact that this new set depends on IC.
At the limit, if the constraints express that all the hypotheses are mutually exclusive we get DIC = 2.
Thus, by considering constraints IC, any expression E of D (the hyper power set without constraints) can be reduced
into an expression of DIC .
Example 3. Let = {θ1, θ2, θ3}. Consider the constraint θ1 ∩ θ2 = ∅. Then the expression θ1 ∩ (θ2 ∪ θ3) of D is reduced
to θ1 ∩ θ3.
Finally, several combination rules are defined in [15]. We do not need to detail them here.
4. Reformulation by using logic
In this section, we use propositional logic to show that the cases of non-exclusive hypotheses can be reformulated in
the classical framework of Dempster–Shafer’s Theory. We first focus on the case of free models then we address the more
general case of hybrid models.
4.1. Reformulation of the case of free models
First, based on [2],we can show that themain notions ofDempster–Shafer Theory, such as frameof discernment, hypothe-
ses, intersections, unions, etc. as well as the notion of rcnf-expressions introduced here, can be given a logical interpretation.
This is shown in the following.
A frameof discernement = {θ1, . . . , θn} canbemapped to a logical propositional languagewithnpropositional letters.
By convention, this propositional language will also be denoted by  and the propositional letters will also be denoted by
θ1, . . . , θn. Correspondingly it follows that:
• A union of hypotheses can be assigned to a positive clause.
For instance θ1 ∪ θ2 is associated with θ1 ∨ θ2.• An intersection of unions of hypotheses can be associated with a conjunction of positive clauses.
For instance, θ1 ∩ (θ2 ∪ θ3) is associated with θ1 ∧ (θ2 ∨ θ3).• Aunionofhypotheses is included in another one iff the clause associatedwith thefirst one subsumes the clause associated
with the second one. For instance, θ1 ⊂ (θ1 ∪ θ2) and equivalently, θ1 subsumes (θ1 ∨ θ2).
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Fig. 1. The case of free models
• An expression under reduced conjunctive normal form (rncf-expression) can be associated with a +mcnf-formula.
For instance, the rncf-expression θ1 ∩ (θ2 ∪ θ3) is associated with the +mcnf-formula θ1 ∧ (θ2 ∨ θ3).• Finally, assuming exhaustivity of hypotheses comes to considering the formula σ0 = θ1 ∨ · · · ∨ θn as true.
This logical interpretation of Dempster–Shafer Theory is then used to show the following result:
Theorem 3. Let  be a frame of the case of free models. There exists a frame σ0 with exhaustive and exclusive hypotheses and
there exists a function T which translates any expression E of D into an expression T(E) of a 2
σ0
.
Proof. Theproof consists in constructing the function T . To this end,wedefine T by composing the following three functions:
(1) By the logical interpretation mentioned previously, we know that any expression E of D, which is then a rcnf-
expression, is associated with a +mcnf-formula of propositional language . Let us also denote E this formula.
(2) Consider cE , the equivalence class of formula E given relation
σ0↔.
(3) Let mod(σ0) the truth-set of σ0. By proposition 1, we know that cE can be associated with Mod
σ0(cE) which belongs
to 2mod(σ0).Modσ0(cE) is then a subset of models of σ0.
(4) Furthermore, consider the new frame of discernment, denotedmod(σ0), whose hypotheses correspond to models of
σ0 and thus, are mutually exclusive.
Any element of 2mod(σ0) can then be associated with a union of hypotheses of this new frame of discernment.
In particular, if Modσ0(cE) = {w1, . . . ,wn} then we can associate it with the expression w1 ∪ · · · ∪ wn of frame
mod(σ0).
T(E) is this very expression.
(5) Finally, the frame σ0 we aim to prove its existence is the frame introduced in point 4, mod(σ0), whose hypotheses
are by, construction, exhaustive and exclusive. 
Fig. 1 sums up the construction of T .
Example 4. Consider  = {θ1, θ2, θ3}. We associate this frame with the propositional language  whose letters are
θ1, θ2, θ3. We have: σ0 = θ1 ∨ θ2 ∨ θ3. Andmod(σ0) = {w1,w2, . . . ,w7}with:
w1 = {θ1, θ2, θ3}, w2 = {θ1, θ2,¬θ3}, w3 = {θ1,¬θ2, θ3}, w4 = {θ1,¬θ2,¬θ3},
w5 = {¬θ1, θ2, θ3}, w6 = {¬θ1, θ2,¬θ3}, w7 = {¬θ1,¬θ2, θ3}.
• Consider the expression E1 = θ1 ∩ θ2 of D. E1 is associated with the formula θ1 ∧ θ2 (point 1). Then we consider cθ1∧θ2
the equivalence class of this formula (point 2). By functionModσ0 this equivalence class is associatedwith {w1,w2} (point
3). Now the new frame isσ0 = {w1, . . . ,w7}. Finally (point 4) {w1,w2} is associatedwith an expression of 2σ0 which
is w1 ∪ w2. Consequently, T(E1) = w1 ∪ w2.• Consider the expression E2 = θ1 ∪ θ2. In the same way, we can show that T(E2) = w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4 ∪ w5 ∪ w6.• As for the expression E3 = θ1 ∪ (θ2 ∩ θ3), we have: T(E3) = w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4 ∪ w5.
Theorem 4. T is not a bijection.
Proof. This is a consequence of Theorem 2. Indeed, there are some elements of 2mod(σ0) which are the image by Modσ0 of
equivalence classes of formulas which are not +mcnf-formulas.
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For instance, in the previous example, the expressionw3 ∨ w4 has no antecedent by T since the antecedent byModσ1 of{w3,w4} is the equivalence class of θ1 ∧ ¬θ2 which is not a +mcnf-formula. 
In fact, T is not a bijection because expressions of hyper-power-set D are only built with ∩ and ∪ operators. The
complementation operator (which would correspond to logical negation) is missing.
Theorem 5. Let  be a frame of the free case model. There exists a function T which translates any basic belief assignment m
defined on D into a basic belief assignment, denoted T(m), defined on 2
σ0
.
Proof. The proof is constructive. Let m be a basic assignment defined on the hyper-power-set D. The basic assignment
T(m) is defined on 2
σ0
as follows. Let E ∈ 2σ0 .
• If e is the image by T of an expression of D, then: T(m)(e) = m(T−1(e))
• Else T(m)(e) = 0 
Example 5. Consider the framedefined in Example 4. Letm defined onD by:m(θ1) = 0.80,m(θ2) = 0.15,m(θ1∩θ2) =
0.05. Then, the basic belief assignment T(m) is defined on 2
σ0
by: T(m)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4) = 0.80, T(m)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪
w5 ∪ w6) = 0.15, T(m)(w1 ∪ w2) = 0.05.
Theorem 6. Let  be a frame of discernment and let m1 and m2 be two basic belief assignments defined on D
. Then for any
expression E of D:
m1[⊕]m2(E) = T(m1) ⊕ T(m2)(T(E))
Proof
• First we show that if A, B and C are expressions in D then A ∩ B = C iff T(A) ∩ T(B) = T(C).
Indeed, A ∩ B = C
⇐⇒ σ0 | A ∧ B ↔ C (where here, A, B and C are formulas)⇐⇒ Modσ0(A) ∩ Modσ0(B) = Modσ0(C)
⇐⇒ T(A) ∩ T(B) = T(C)
• Consequently, with Theorem 5, we have:
∑
A∩B=C
m1(A) · m2(B) =
∑
T(A)∩T(B)=T(C)
T(m1)(T(A)) · T(m2)(T(B))
• Then finally,
∑
A∩B=C m1(A) · m2(B)∑
A∩B =∅ m1(A) · m2(B) =
∑
T(A)∩T(B)=T(C) T(m1)(T(A)) · T(m2)(T(B))∑
T(A)∩T(B)=∅ T(m1)(T(A)) · T(m2)(T(B))
i.em1[⊕]m2(E) = T(m1) ⊕ T(m2)(T(E)). 
This theorem shows that the normalized combination rule defined in the framework of the free models (see Section 3.2)
is equivalent to Dempster’s combination rule, when they are respectively applied on expressions E of D and T(E) of 2
σ0
.
Example 6. This is Example 11 of [8]. Letm1 andm2 be two basic belief assignments on D
:
m1(θ1) = 0.80 m1(θ2) = 0.15 m1(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0 m1(θ1 ∩ θ2) = 0.05
m2(θ1) = 0.90 m2(θ2) = 0.05 m2(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0 m2(θ1 ∩ θ2) = 0.05
We have:
m1[⊕]m2(θ1) = 0.72 m1[⊕]m2(θ2) = 0.0075
m1[⊕]m2(θ1 ∪ θ2) = 0 m1[⊕]m2(θ1 ∩ θ2) = 0.2725
Consider now the frame: σ0 = {w1,w2, . . . ,w7} (see Example 4). Then T(m1) and T(m2) are the assignments:
T(m1)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4) = 0.80
T(m1)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w5 ∪ w6) = 0.15
T(m1)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4 ∪ w5 ∪ w6) = 0
T(m1)(w1 ∪ w2) = 0.05
T(m2)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4) = 0.90
T(m2)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w5 ∪ w6) = 0.05
T(m2)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4 ∪ w5 ∪ w6) = 0
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Fig. 2. The case of hybrid models.
T(m2)(w1 ∪ w2) = 0.05
If we apply Dempster’s combination rule on these new assignments we get:
T(m1) ⊕ T(m2)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4) = 0.72
T(m1) ⊕ T(m2)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w5 ∪ w6) = 0.0075
T(m1) ⊕ T(m2)(w1 ∪ w2 ∪ w3 ∪ w4 ∪ w5 ∪ w6) = 0
T(m1) ⊕ T(m2)(w1 ∪ w2) = 0.2725
Obviously, we havem1[⊕]m2 = T(m1) ⊕ T(m2)
4.2. Reformulation of the case of hybrid models
As we did in the previous section, we build a function which associates any expression of D to an expression of a new
frame of discernment whose hypotheses are exhaustive and exclusive. The frame  = {θ1, . . . , θn} is associated with a
propositional language  whose letters are θ1, . . . , θn.
Similarly,we can associate the expression IC to a logical formulawe still denote IC. For instance, the constraint θ1∩θ2 = ∅
is associated with the formula¬(θ1 ∧ θ2).
The results of Theorem 3 can be adapted in the context of hybridmodels by considering the formula σ1 = σ0∧ IC instead
of the formula σ0. Thus,
Theorem 7. Let  be a frame of the hybrid case model and let IC be the associated integrity constraint. Let σ1 be the formula
σ0 ∧ IC. Then , there exists a function T which translates any expression E of D into an expression T(E) of a 2σ1 .
Proof. The proof is obtained from the proof of Theorem 3 by replacing σ0 by σ1.
Fig. 2 illustrates the construction of T . 
Example 7. Take Example 4 and consider the constraint IC : θ1 ∩ θ2 = ∅. It corresponds to the formula ¬(θ1 ∧ θ2), then
σ1 = (θ1 ∨ θ2 ∨ θ3) ∧ ¬(θ1 ∧ θ2). And we getmod(σ1) = {w3,w4,w5,w6,w7}.
Consider the expression E4 = θ1 ∩ (θ2 ∪ θ3). The formula which is associated with it is E4 = θ1 ∧ (θ2 ∨ θ3). Let CE4 be
its equivalence class for relation
σ1↔. We haveModσ1(CE4) = {w3}. Finally T(E4) = w3.
Theorem 8. T is not a bijection.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 4. 
Theorem 9. Let  be a frame of the hybrid case model. There exists a function which translates any basic belief assignment m
defined on D into a basic belief assignment, denoted T(m), defined on 2
σ1
.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 5. 
Theorem 10. Let [•] be any combination rule on the hyper-power-set. Then, there exists a combination rule, denoted • defined
in the classical Dempster–Shafer Theory on the frame σ1 so that, if m1 and m2 are two basic belief assignments defined on D
,
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then for any E ∈ D
m1[•]m2(E) = T(m1) • T(m2)(T(E))
Proof. LetM1 andM2 be two assignments on 
σ1 . Let e an expression of σ1 . ThenM1 • M2 is as follows: 
• If e is the image by T of an expression of D then:
M1 • M2(e) = T−1(M1)[•]T−1(M2)(T−1(e))• ElseM1 • M2(e) = 0
This result ensures that, since there is a projection from the hyper power set D into σ1 , any combination rule defined
over D can be projected into a combination rule over σ1 .
Notice that this result doesnotprovide an intensional definitionof this very combination rule. Indeed thegeneral equation
which definesM1 • M2 is not known. However, for each expression ewe know how to computeM1 • M2(e), i.e., this result
gives an extensional definition of •.
5. Discussion
The last theorem shows there exists a strong relationship between frames of discernment with exhaustive but not exclu-
sive hypotheses as introduced by Dezert [8] and frames of discernment with hypotheses which are exhaustive and exclusive
as considered by the classical Dempster–Shafer Theory. It ensures that any combination rule defined in the framework of
non-exclusive hypotheses can be reformulated in the framework of Dempster–Shafer Theory if we change the frames of
discernment.
As mentioned previously, this theorem is not constructive nor does it provide an intensional definition of this very
combination rule. Nevertheless correspondences have been established for some of the rules. For instance, it has been
proved [5], that the hybrid combination rule corresponds to Dubois and Prade’s rule [10].
From these correspondences, we can conclude that everything which is done with non-exclusive hypotheses can be
done in the framework of exclusive hypotheses. This is consistent with Daniel’s work [6], who obtained the same result in a
different way.
It must be noticed that the result we have proved here was already known by the authors of [15] themselves. Indeed,
they have shown that any frame of discernment  (for instance {θ1, θ2}) can be transformed into a frame of discernment
they call refined- and denoted 2, with exclusive hypotheses ({θ1 − θ2, θ1 ∧ θ2, θ2 − θ1}). But for them, this new frame
of discernment had no meaning [9]. While here, we show that it makes sense in logic.
Moreover, we think that this present paper will help logicians to understand the extension of Dempster–Shafer Theory
to non-exclusive hypotheses.
Indeed, the main contribution of our work is to use mathematical logic to show the correspondence between Dempster–
Shafer Theory and its extension to non-exclusive hypotheses.More precisely,we have shown that this extensionmanipulates
formulas of a propositional language (the syntax side of logic) and thatDempster–Shafer Theorymanipulatesmodels of these
formulas (the semantics side of logic).
Proving a strong relation between the two is not surprising. It is well known that knowledge or beliefs can be modeled
by formulas (syntactic side) or equivalently by their models (semantics side).
Notice that a side effect of our contribution is to highlight the fact that complementation is missing in expressions
considered by the framework studied in [8]. Taking complementation into account would lead to all the richness of the
logical language. In this case, function T would be a bijection.
However, let us add that, even not more powerful than Dempster–Shafer framework, the main advantage we see to
theory of [8] is the compactness of the expressions on which basic assignments are formulated. For instance (see Example
4), it is more compact to consider expressions that can be built from 3 non-exclusive hypotheses θ1, θ2, θ3 than to consider
expressions that can be build with 7 exclusive hypotheses w1, . . . ,w7.
It must be noticed that this argument of compactness is exactly the same which is used in classical logic to argue that
formulas can be used to model knowledge in a more compact form than sets of interpretations. It is also the same argument
that is used in preference representation [11] to argue that expressing preferences over formulas is more compact than
expressing preferences over interpretations (called alternatives). Similarly, it is more compact to assign masses to formulas
(or expressions of an hyper power set) instead of assigning masses to sets of interpretations (expressions of a power set).
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